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Somewhere in Between:  The Classification and  
Standard of Review of Mixed Ministerial – Discretionary 
Land Use Decisions  
Rozalynne Thompson* 
I. Introduction
The California Constitution,1 along with federal case law,2 confers the 
police power to local agencies to regulate the health, safety, and welfare of 
its citizens.3  Under this authority, local agencies4 make land use decisions, 
from a simple grant of a business license to granting a general plan 
amendment along with associated entitlements.  Since land use regulation 
has been a legitimate exercise of a local agency’s police power, challenges 
to these decisions have proliferated and courts have, accordingly, reviewed 
these decisions for conformance with applicable statutes and ordinances. 
As the principles from cases in this frontier of law have been refined, so too 
have the land use regulations.  Since many of these land use regulatory 
tools are promulgated and adopted by cities, courts must strike a balance 
between ensuring proper enforcement of the laws by the agency and 
respecting the local agency’s legitimacy and authority in its jurisdiction 
* J.D. Candidate, 2009, University of California Hastings College of the
Law, San Francisco, California.  Ms. Thompson would especially like to thank
Professor Shute for his guidance and the journal’s staff for preparing this
note for publication.  Ms. Thompson would also like to thank all of those
who have helped her along – in actions both great and small – toward
completion of this note.  You know who you are.  And, last, but certainly not
least, this note is dedicated to the loving memory of Sylvia L. Thompson.
1. The California Constitution allows cities to “make and enforce
within [their] limits all local police, sanitary, and other ordinances and 
regulations not in conflict with general laws.”  CAL. CONST. art. XI, § 7.
2. Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954).
3. Associated Home Builders, Inc. v. City of Livermore, 18 Cal. 3d 582 (1976)
(holding that a land use regulation is within a jurisdiction’s police power if it 
is reasonably related to the public welfare). 
4. “Local agencies” refers broadly to the cities and counties as a
whole, and also planning commissions, city councils, and board of 
supervisors. 
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when reviewing land use decisions.5  An important decision is the 
classification of an agency’s land use action as ministerial or discretionary, 
especially when it adopts a novel tool to address land use issues.  Not only 
does this classification dictate the review process a local agency must 
undertake, but it also determines the standard of judicial review should the 
agency’s action be challenged.   
This note will discuss land use actions of a mixed ministerial-
discretionary character.  In particular, this note will discuss the development 
of statutes and cases classifying certain actions as either ministerial or 
discretionary, first in the common law context, then in the context of the 
California Environmental Quality Act (“CEQA”).6  Then, it will give a basic
overview of the judicial review process of land use decisions and discuss the 
appropriate standard of review for mixed ministerial-discretionary decisions. 
This Note contends that since it appears that no local agency has defined 
what constitutes a mixed ministerial-discretionary project and because there 
is disunity among the courts on this issue, the definition in CEQA of a mixed 
ministerial-discretionary should be the rule, not the exception.  As a result, 
courts should apply the standard of review for mixed ministerial-
discretionary actions  –  administrative mandamus – when reviewing an 
agency’s decision. 
II. What are Mixed Ministerial – Discretionary Land Use Decisions?
A. The Ministerial/Discretionary Distinction Under the Common Law
As early as 1860, the Supreme Court of California established the 
general principle that ministerial acts are those that are “enumerated and
defined by the law,” regarding which a government official “has no
discretion.”7  As a wave of local governments implemented planning and
zoning mechanisms during the first half of the twentieth century, California 
courts began to refine the meaning of “ministerial” in the land use context
as legal challenges ensued. 
5. The Separation of Powers doctrine does not apply to local agencies
in California.  In California, there are chartered cities and general law cities. 
Chartered cities have a charter that is the source of the primary law and 
under CAL. CONST. art. XI, § 7, they have the authority to make decisions
concerning local affairs, such as land use, within their jurisdictional 
boundaries as long as no conflict of laws occurs.  Scott D. Noble, Nuisance, 
Trespass, and Strict Liability for Ultrahazardous Activities, § 1.01 NUISANCE,
CALIFORNIA ENVIRONMENTAL AND LAND USE PRACTICE (2008). 
6. CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 21000 et seq. (West 2009).
7. People ex rel. McCauley & Tevis v. Brooks, 16 Cal. 11, 55 (1860).
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In 1956, the Court of Appeal in the First Appellate District addressed 
whether issuance of a land use permit to create a residential subdivision 
was a ministerial act in Roney v. Board of Supervisors.8  In Roney, the county of 
Contra Costa had adopted a zoning ordinance in which ninety percent of the 
county lands had zoning designations A through K.  The districts progressed 
in intensity: the A zoning district only allowed single-family residential units, 
whereas uses in the K district were unrestricted.9  The plaintiff owned land in 
the J district, which allowed heavy industrial uses by right, but required a 
land use permit for any other use, including residential.  The plaintiff 
applied for a land use permit to subdivide their land into a residential tract, 
but the Contra Costa Planning Commission and Board of Supervisors denied 
their request.  In rejecting plaintiff landowner’s claim that the county 
officials had no discretion to deny their land use permit, the court reasoned 
that since the state legislature mandated master plans, the Board of 
Supervisors could not effectuate the master plan’s purpose if land use 
permits were ministerial.10  The court then evaluated the text and the history 
of the ordinance for additional evidentiary support.11  That the ordinance 
created an elaborate procedure for the land use permit, including notice, a 
public hearing, and a factual inquiry of the project, and that the county 
amended its ordinance to prevent residential uses in industrial districts, 
further convinced the court that the land use permits were discretionary, not 
ministerial.12  
Five years later, in Day v. Los Angeles, the Court of Appeal in the Second 
Appellate District held that an enactment of a rezoning ordinance is not 
ministerial act.13  As in Roney, plaintiff landowner filed an application to 
rezone his parcel to permit residential uses.14  Los Angeles city officials15 
approved the rezoning request subject to several conditions, including one 
that required submittal and approval of a tentative tract map and another 
that directed the Planning Director to forward his recommendation to city 
officials before the rezoning hearing.16  After city officials approved both the 
tentative and final maps, the City Council denied the rezoning request based 
on the Planning Director’s assertion that the “‘change of the property to the
8. 138 Cal. App. 2d 740 (1956).




13. 189 Cal. App. 2d 415 (1961).
14. Id. at 416-17.
15. In this case, “city officials” refers to the Los Angeles Planning
Commission, City Council, and City Engineer. 
16. Day, supra note 14.
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RA Zone without the provision of necessary improvements would not 
conform with good zoning practice, and could therefore not meet the 
requirements for a change of zone established by Section 12.32 of the 
Municipal Code.’”17
To distinguish ministerial actions from the actions undertaken by city 
officials in Day, the court relied on two California Supreme Court cases for 
guidance.  Whereas the denial of the rezoning request was “an exercise of a
discretion residing in the city council,”18 a ministerial action “‘require[d] an
officer to do a prescribed act upon a prescribed contingencyFalse’”19  The
denial of the rezoning request, the court explained, was not ministerial 
because the City Council had the authority to choose whether to approve or 
deny the project.20 
Since Day, courts have distinguished ministerial acts from discre-
tionary ones.  For example, the following are all examples of ministerial acts: 
1) approval of a final subdivision map that substantially conforms to the
tentative map is ministerial;21 2) issuance of a building permit that is
consistent with the building and zoning code regulations;22 and 3) the
issuance of a conditional use permit for a secondary dwelling unit which
meets the state’s statutory requirements.23 On the other hand, variances
from development regulations,24 tentative subdivision and parcel maps,25
conditional use permits,26 planned unit developments,27 and coastal
development permits,28 have been held to be discretionary land use
decisions.
There are no cases in the common law addressing the issue as to 
whether an action is a mixed ministerial-discretionary one.  All of the cases 
17. 189 Cal. App. 2d at 418.
18. Id. at 419.
19. Id. at 420 (quoting Drummey v. State Bd. of Funeral Dirs., 13 Cal. 2d 75,
83 (1983)). 
20. Id.
21. Youngblood v. Bd. of Supervisors, 22 Cal. 3d 644 (1978).
22. Prentiss v. City of S. Pasadena, 15 Cal. App. 4th 85 (1993).
23. Wilson v. City of Laguna Beach, 6 Cal. App. 4th 543 (1992).
24. Topanga Ass’n for a Scenic Cmty. v. County of Los Angeles, 11 Cal. 3d 506,
517 (1974). 
25. Horn v. County of Ventura , 24 Cal. 3d 605, 612 (1979).
26. Id. at 614; Johnston v. City of Claremont, 49 Cal. 2d 826, 834 (1958);
Neighborhood Action Group v. County of Calaveras, 156 Cal. App. 3d 1176, 1186 (1984). 
27. City of Fairfield v. Superior Court, 14 Cal. 3d 768, 773 (1973).
28. Patterson v. Cent. Coast Regulation Comm’n, 58 Cal. App. 3d 833, 840-41 (1976). 
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addressing this issue occur within the context of the California 
Environmental Quality Act (“CEQA”), as discussed below.
B. Ministerial and Discretionary Land Use Decisions as Defined by
the California Environmental Quality Act
The California Legislature’s enactment of CEQA in 1970 was pivotal in 
clarifying the distinction between ministerial and discretionary land use 
decisions and creating uniformity among the courts.29  The main purpose of 
CEQA, like its federal predecessor, the National Environmental Policy Act 
(NEPA), was to identify and disclose potential significant environmental 
impacts of projects to the public and to mitigate those impacts.30  In its 
original form, the provisions of CEQA addressed environmental concerns in 
broad policy language, which raised problems of judicial interpretation.31  
29. See CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 21000 et seq. (West 2009).
30. See 42 U.S.C. § 4321 et seq. Ch. 22, § 22.10, contains discussion of
some of the similarities and differences between CEQA and NEPA. 
31. The original provisions of CEQA were based on recommendations
made by the California Assembly Select Committee on Environmental 
Quality in a legislative staff entitled the Environmental Goals and Policy 
Report.  The composition of the Select Committee on Environmental Quality 
included chairs of Assembly committees and subcommittees, such as John 
Knox, George Milias, Jean Moorhead Duffy, John Foran, Robert Monagan, 
and Peter Schabarum.  Specifically, the study recommended 34 policy 
changes to protect the environment, including an enumerated 
Environmental Bill of Rights, the adoption of and Environmental Quality Act 
modeled after NEPA, and an improved planning process across all levels of 
government overseen by the OPR.  The OPR plays a critical role, for it 
promulgates the CEQA Guidelines.  For further discussion on the 
development of the Environmental Goals and Policy Report, see Nico 
Calavita, Legislative History of the California Environmental Goals and Policy Report, in 
FACULTY FELLOWS PROGRAM CALIFORNIA STATE UNIVERSITY (1995).   
The implementation language of the original version of CEQA passed in 
1970 was as follows:  
Chapter 3.  STATE AGENCIES, BOARDS, AND COMMISSIONS 
21100.  All state agencies, boards, and commissions shall include in 
any report on any project they propose to carry out which could have a 
significant effect on the environment of the state, a detailed statement 
by the responsible state official setting forth the following: 
• The environmental effect of the proposed action.
• Any adverse environmental effects which cannot be avoided if the
proposal is implemented. 
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One such problem was determination of how to define the scope of the 
statute’s applicability.  The California Supreme Court delineated the ambit 
of CEQA in the seminal case Friends of Mammoth v. Board of Supervisors of Mono 
County, holding that although the statute does not expressly define “project,”
it applies to the regulation of private activities and government projects.32  
The broad sweep of the holding in Friends of Mammoth and the resultant 
outcry from the construction industry prompted the Legislature to refine the 
statute in the 1972 amendments, also known as Assembly Bill (AB) 889.33  As 
• Mitigation measures of the proposed action.
• Alternatives to the proposed action.
• The relationship between local short-term uses of man’s
environment and the maintenance and enhancement of long-
term productivity.   
• Any irreversible environmental changes which would be involved
in the proposed action should it be implemented. 
CHAPTER 4.  LOCAL AGENCIES 
21150.  State agencies, boards, and commissions, responsible for 
allocating state or federal funds on a project-by-project basis to local 
government agencies for land acquisition or construction projects 
which may have a significant effect on the environment, shall…require
from the responsible local government agency a detailed statement 
setting for the matters specified in Section 21100 prior to the allocation 
of any funds, other than funds solely for planning purposes. 
21151.  The legislative bodies of all cities and counties which have an 
officially adopted conservation element of a general plan shall make a 
finding that any project they intend to carry out, which may have a 
significant effect on the environment, is in accord with the 
conservation element of the general plan.  All other local government 
agencies shall make an environmental impact report on any project 
they intend to carry out which may have a significant effect on the 
environment and shall submit it to the appropriate local planning 
agency…
A.B. 2045, ASSEM. REG. SESS. (Cal. 1970). 
32. 8 Cal. 3d 247 (1972).
33. Assembly member John Knox (D-Richmond) authored the A.B. 889
while the public awaited the California Supreme Court’s decision on Friends 
of Mammoth.  The main thrust of A.B. 889 was to “confirm that private projects
were within the ambit of the Act.” The Bill was successfully passed in the
state Assembly, but languished in the state Senate for months.  Once the 
Supreme Court ruled on Friends of Mammoth, A.B. 889 “was seized upon by
various interested parties as the vehicle to clarify the scope, and lessen the 
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a compromise between environmental organizations, local governments, 
and the construction industry, the Legislature codified the holding in Friends 
of Mammoth in the 1972 amendments, but it also added several statutory 
exemptions to the statute to constrict the scope of the holding.34  Thus, 
CEQA only applied to discretionary projects undertaken or approved by a 
government agency and exempted ministerial private and public activities 
from its reach.35 
Moreover, the 1972 amendments also added a chapter entitled 
“Definitions” to clarify the meaning of key terms, but the terms “ministerial”
and “discretionary” were not included in the chapter.36  And, although the
exemption provisions in AB 889 list examples of discretionary and 
nondiscretionary projects, the language of those provisions suggests that 
the Legislature did not intend the examples to be exhaustive.37  The CEQA 
Guidelines (the Guidelines),38 however, resolved some of the ambiguity.  The 
final version of the Guidelines, assigned to the Office of Planning and 
Research (OPR) responsibility to provide guidance in implementing CEQA. 
The OPR completed the highly anticipated Guidelines shortly after the 
impact, of the court’s holding.”  The Legislature finally passed A.B. 889
during the last days of the 1972 session on December 5, 1972.  Carl J. 
Seneker II, The Legislative Response to the Friends of Mammoth, 48 ST. BAR J. 127, 
129 (1973). 
34. Developers, lenders, contractors, and trade unions found
themselves in general alliance seeking validation of completed and ongoing 
projects as well as delay in the implementation of the court’s decision. 
Local governmental entities, unsure of the effect of the ruling on their 
current practices relating to approval of private projects and ill-prepared to 
begin to apply the Act, desired clarification of the Act’s effect on their 
determinations.  Environmental organizations sought to preserve the broad 
sweep of the court’s opinion.  The varied and competing interests of these 
groups resulted in the numerous changes to the original version of A.B. 889 
and the “haste with which the final version of AB 889 was written and
considered.” Id. at 129-30.
35. Id. at 164.
36. CAL. PUB. RES. CODE §§ 21060-21072 (West 2009).
37. Id.
38. Id. § 21080. Pursuant to Section 21083, the Secretary of the
Resources Agency was required to adopt guidelines for the implementation 
of the Act for public agencies within 60 days after the effective date of A.B. 
889. On February 3, 1973, the Secretary adopted the “Guidelines for
Implementation of the California Environmental Quality Act of 1970” as
Chapter 3, Div. 6, tit. 14 of the California Administrative Code.  Seneker,
supra note 33 at 127.
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Legislature adopted AB 889.39  According to the Guidelines, a ministerial 
project is one that is 
undertaken or approved by a governmental decision which a public 
officer or public agency makes upon a given state of facts in a 
prescribed manner in obedience to the mandate of legal authority. 
With these projects, the officer or agency must act upon the given facts 
without regard to his own judgment or opinion concerning the 
propriety or wisdom of the act although the statute, ordinance, or 
regulation may require, in some degree, a construction of its language 
by the officer.40 
On the other hand, a project is “discretionary” when it “requires the
exercise of judgment, deliberation, or decision on the part of the public 
agency or body in the process of approving or disapproving a particular 
activity, as distinguished from situations where the public agency or body 
merely has to determine whether there has been conformity with applicable 
statutes, ordinances or regulations.”41  In effect, the OPR codified the
definitions of ministerial and discretionary upheld in lower court decisions, 
such as Roney and Day, before the enactment of CEQA.   
1. Judicial Interpretations of “Ministerial” and “Discretionary” Under CEQA
in the Land Use Context
a. Land Use Entitlement Cases
Land use entitlements for private activities are presumptively 
discretionary, unless expressly exempted by CEQA.42 Consistent with the 
Supreme Court’s holding in Friends of Mammoth, land use entitlements are 
generally discretionary because the local agency exercises judgment in 
deciding whether to grant the entitlement.  Thus, courts have held that the 
adoption and amendment of a jurisdiction’s general plan is considered 
discretionary under CEQA,43 as is the enactment and amendment of a zoning 
39. Of note is that the draft Guidelines were prepared in 1971, which
would have only applied CEQA to major activities carried out or funded by 
government agencies.  See id. at 128. 
40. CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 14, § 15369 (2009).
41. Id, § 15357.
42. Friends of Mammoth, see supra note 32.
43. CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 21080 (West 2009); Devita v. County of Napa, 9
Cal. 4th 763 (1995). 
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ordinance.44  Variances are also explicitly deemed discretionary under the 
statute, along with the approval of tentative subdivision maps.45  And, in one 
case, the approval of a development agreement was characterized as a 
discretionary act.46  In Friends of Mammoth, the California Supreme Court 
determined that a conditional use permit for the construction of a 
condominium project is discretionary.47 
Design review, also known in some jurisdictions as development 
review or architectural review, however, is not listed as an example of a 
discretionary entitlement in the statute.  And, in the fairly recent CEQA 
cases involving design review entitlements, it is unclear whether design 
review entitlements are properly considered discretionary or ministerial 
actions under CEQA.  In Bowman v. City of Berkeley, the court of appeal 
decided that aesthetic issues, which were part of the local ordinance’s 
design review process, were not within the province of CEQA.48  In that case, 
the neighbors challenged the design review approval and adopted mitigated 
negative declaration for a mixed-use building proposed in Downtown 
Berkeley.49  They contended that the City of Berkeley’s decision to approve 
the project violated CEQA because the adopted mitigated negative 
declaration did not consider the scale of the project, the area of shadow cast 
on neighboring properties due to its bulk, and its interference with scenic 
views.50  The court ruled in favor of the City of Berkeley, highlighting that the 
cases used to support the neighbors’ claims were distinguishable from the 
one at bar because one concerned preparation of an environmental impact 
report (EIR), and the others involved a development in a “environmentally
sensitive area.”51  Moreover, the court noted that they did not believe the
legislature enacted CEQA to require environmental review to assess the 
“aesthetic merits” of projects within highly developed urban areas.52  “To rule
otherwise,” the court opined, “would mean that an EIR would be required for
44. Id. § 21080; Northwood Homes v. Town of Moraga, 216 Cal. App. 3d 1197 (1989). 
45. Id.; Youngblood, see supra note 21.
46. Citizens for a Responsible Gov’t v. City of Albany, 56 Cal. App. 4th 1199 (1997). 
47. Since CEQA is modeled after NEPA but did not expressly define
“discretionary project,” the Court reasoned that a “project” under CEQA is
analogous to “actions” in NEPA.  Given that an “entitlement for use” is
subsumed under the definition of “action” in NEPA, “projects” under CEQA
include “entitlements for use” as well.  See supra note 32 at 262.
48. 122 Cal. App. 4th 572 (2004).
49. Id. at 580.
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every urban building project that is not exempt under CEQA if enough 
people could be marshaled to complain about how it will look.”53
While the Bowman court thought that the design review process was 
outside the ambit of CEQA, two other cases, in dicta, suggest that a design 
review decision is discretionary.  The first case, Cucamongans United for 
Reasonable Expansion v. City of Rancho Cucamonga, considered whether the denial 
of a design review request warranted additional environmental review.54  The 
City of Rancho Cucamonga had approved a tentative tract map in 1990, and 
the developer filed a Development Review project application with the city’s 
planning department in 1997.55  After the planning commission approved the 
project, Cucamongans United for Reasonable Expansion (“CURE”) appealed
the decision to the city council.56  After an extensive public hearing,57 the city 
council denied the developer’s development review application.58  CURE 
filed an action to direct the city to prepare further environmental review of 
the project.  The court of appeal rejected their claim, referencing the 
applicable provision of the Guidelines when it stated that “an SEIR
[supplemental environmental impact report] can only be prepared in 
connection with a discretionary approval (emphasis added).”59  The corollary
to this, the court explained in dicta, is that since the city denied the 
development review permit – a discretionary decision – preparing an SEIR 
was unnecessary.60 
The other case, Friends of Davis v. City of Davis,61 was decided a month 
later.  In that case, the appellate court addressed whether the city could use 
the design review ordinance to exclude a bookstore from locating in a 
proposed commercial center in downtown Davis.62  Although two EIRs on 
the subject property were certified and a negative declaration adopted for 
the annexed portion of the property, citizens attempted to challenge the 
developer’s pending lease agreement with Borders Bookstores during the 
staff-level design review process.63  Once the planning and building 
department staff issued the notice of intent to approve the project, citizens 
53. 122 Cal. App. 4th at 592.
54. 82 Cal. App. 4th 473 (2000).
55. Id. at 478.
56. Id. at 477.
57. The city council hearing lasted over six hours.  Id. at 476.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 479.
60. Id.
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appealed to the planning commission,64  but the planning commission 
upheld the staff’s approval of the project.65  The citizens then appealed to 
the city council and the city council rejected their request to deny the design 
review approval.66  The court sided with the city in this case, concluding that 
the design review ordinance does not extend to tenant approval.67  Although 
the court did not decide the issue of whether the design review approval 
constituted a ministerial or discretionary decision, it commented that the 
design review ordinance “entails an exercise of discretion.”68
b. Building Permit Cases
Whereas land use entitlement decisions are presumed discretionary, 
the Guidelines generally presume that in the absence of a governing law 
defining “ministerial,” the issuance of building permits is a ministerial act.69
There are numerous cases addressing whether an agency’s issuance of a 
building permit and related permits is ministerial or discretionary under 
CEQA.  For instance, the appellate court held that issuance of the building 
permit was ministerial where an addition to a potential historic structure 
was consistent with applicable zoning and building code requirements.70  
Also, courts have held that the issuance of a demolition permit to raze a 
historic dwelling is ministerial in nature.71  And, another court held that the 
issuance of a grading permit was ministerial when the grading conformed to 
specified, fixed standards.72  These cases illustrate that although there is a 





68. Id. at 1015, see supra note 6.
69. CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 14, §15073 (2009); The guidelines provide,
however, that the determination of what is “ministerial” can most be
appropriately be made by each public agency based upon an analysis of its 
own governing laws, but that in the absence of any discretionary provision 
contained in a locl ordinance, it will be presumed that the issuance of 
building permits, business licenses, the approval of subdivision maps, and 
the approval of individual utility service connections and disconnections are 
ministerial.  Seneker, see supra note 33. 
70. Prentiss, supra note 22.
71. Adams Point Pres. Soc’y v. City of Oakland, 192 Cal. App. 3d 203 (1987).
72. See Day v. City of Glendale, 51 Cal. App. 3d 817 (1975).
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under CEQA,73 there have been exceptions to that general presumption in 
recent cases where elements of discretion have been found.  For example, 
recent cases have narrowed the general presumption to situations where the 
local agency’s discretion was limited to only determining compliance with 
zoning and building code requirements.74   
c. Historical Resource Cases
In cases involving historic structures, courts generally find that even if 
a building is listed, or eligible for listing, in a local, state, or national 
inventory of historic resources, a local agency’s decision regarding the 
alteration of the structure may not necessarily be discretionary.75  In one 
case, the court denied a writ of mandate request to compel compliance with 
CEQA before a historic structure was demolished because the issuance of 
the demolition permit was ministerial.76  Furthermore, the mere fact that the 
state’s Historic Building Code applies to the structure does not grant the 
local agency discretion in issuance of a building permit.77  Also, an 
ordinance giving the local historic resources board the authority to delay 
issuance of a building permit while assessing alternative preservation 
methods for a historic structure is ministerial.78  If, however, the structure is 
subject to a historic preservation ordinance or statute that encourages 
cooperation between the government agency and the property owner, then 
decisions involving preservation of the structure are discretionary.79  
Whether an act is ministerial or discretionary in this context thus turns on 
the existence of a historic preservation ordinance and the extent to which 
the ordinance interferes with the owner’s use of the property.  Statutes and 
73. The Guidelines provide some assistance by setting forth a general
presumption that building permit issuance is ministerial in the absence of 
any discretion. The Guidelines further provide that building permit issuance 
is considered ministerial if the building permit ordinance limits agency 
discretion to determining only whether the building construction meets 
zoning requirements, whether the structure meets Uniform Building Code 
strength requirements, and whether the applicant’s fee has been paid.  CAL.
CODE REGS. tit. 14, § 15369 (2009).
74. Day, supra note 72; Friends of Westwood v. City of Los Angeles, 191 Cal.
App. 3d 259 (1987); Miller v. City of Hermosa Beach, 13 Cal. App. 4th 1118 (1993). 
75. See Prentiss, supra note 22.
76. Id.
77. Id.
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ordinances that compel property owners to preserve historic structures are 
viewed with disfavor by the courts because these laws significantly interfere 
with the owner’s use of their property and constitute a regulatory taking.80 
2. Judicial Interpretations of Mixed Ministerial-Discretionary Projects under
CEQA in the Land Use Context
The Guidelines acknowledge a third category of agency decisions: 
mixed ministerial-discretionary projects.81  Unlike discretionary and 
ministerial projects, the Guidelines neither have a separate provision for 
“mixed ministerial-discretionary” projects nor separate provisions that
define them.  Rather, the mixed ministerial-discretionary projects are 
mentioned as a subsection of the “ministerial projects” statutory
exemption.82  At first glance, the reference to “mixed ministerial-
discretionary projects” in the “ministerial projects” section implies that the
Legislature intended to characterize those projects as ministerial.  But, the 
provision states quite the contrary.  “[W]here a project involves an approval
that contains elements of both a ministerial action and a discretionary 
action, the project will be deemed to be discretionary and will be subject to 
the requirements of CEQA.”83 This definition comports with the CEQA’s
overarching aim to “afford the fullest possible protection to the
environment . . . .”84  Thus, where an agency’s ordinance or building code
allows the local agency to exercise discretion beyond just determining a 
project’s consistency with applicable regulations, the courts have generally 
found that such discretion gives the local agency the opportunity to mitigate 
potential environmental impacts, and, therefore is a mixed ministerial-
discretionary action under CEQA.85 
80. Id.
81. CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 14, § 15268 (2009).
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Friends of Mammoth, supra note 32 at 259.
85. “The final version of A.B. 889 deleted the reference to building
permits being ministerial in nature, but retained the exemption for 
ministerial project, thus in effect leaving to the State Guidelines and local 
regulations the resolution of the issue whether environmental impact 
reports are required prior to the issuance of building permits for projects 
which meet all local zoning requirements and for which an environmental 
impact report has not previously been prepared.  Since the Guidelines have 
specifically provided that the issuance of building permits is presumed to be 
ministerial, and since local zoning ordinances typically authorize various 
permitted uses within districts without further local approval even though a 
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Cases involving mixed ministerial-discretionary projects are rare in 
CEQA jurisprudence.  In total, there are eight cases addressing mixed 
ministerial-discretionary projects, and five of them concern land use 
decisions.  The first issue addressed in this line of cases was whether a 
construction permit for a mobile home park is discretionary or ministerial.86  
In ruling that the construction permit issued was of a mixed ministerial-
discretionary character, the court focused on the fact that the permit had to 
comply with “fixed design and construction statutes in specification and
regulation” yet had to meet standards which were dependent on the
expertise and personal judgment of the decision maker.87  The court, 
however, did not make a bright-line determination about when the character 
of a decision crosses the threshold from being wholly ministerial or 
discretionary to being a mixture of both.  Rather, it expressed that the 
underlying principle governing these cases is that “[s]tatutory policy, not
semantics, forms the standard for segregating ministerial projects from 
discretionary ones.”88
The next four cases in this jurisprudence establish that building, 
grading, and demolition permit processes that give the local agency the 
latitude to modify a project are mixed ministerial-discretionary actions.89  
The courts did not make bright-line rules determining what degree of 
latitude exercised is dispositive of a mixed ministerial-discretionary action. 
Instead, they made factual inquires into the decision makers’ actions and 
focused on the circumstances of each case.  In the building permit context, 
the fact that a permit involves general rather than specific standards is an 
important factor.  For instance, determinations as to whether a site was well 
substantial actual change in land use results, it appears that environmental 
impact reports will not be required prior to the issuance of building permits 
for projects meeting all local zoning requirements unless local ordinances 
specifically grant discretion to local officials in granting such permits. 
However, use of this potential loophole will probably be rare in that most 
projects which might have a significant effect on the environment will 
normally require other discretionary approvals prior to the issuance of a 
building permit such as a subdivision map approval…”  Seneker, supra note
35 at 165 n.14. 
86. People v. Dept. of Housing & Cmty. Dev. (Ramey), 45 Cal. App. 3d
185 (1975). 
87. Id. at 193.
88. 45 Cal. App. 3d at 194.
89. Ronald E. Bass and Albert I. Herson., Preliminary Review, Exemptions,
and Negative Declarations, CALIFORNIA ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND LAND USE
PRACTICE (2008); Friends of Westwood, supra note 74; Day, supra note 73; Miller, 
supra note 74; Orinda Ass’n v. Bd. Of Supervisors, 182 Cal. App. 3d 1145 (1986). 
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drained,90 “addressed to the sound judgment and enlightened choice of the
administrator,”91 and had adequate ingress and egress,92 are considered such
general standards.  Another factor is whether the local agency has “shape[d]
the project in any way which would respond to any of the concerns which 
might be identified in an environmental impact report.”93  In other words,
approval of the project cannot be legally compelled unless the design of the 
project is changed to minimize environmental impacts.94  Examples of such 
action include conditioning a permit upon completion of traffic, soils, and 
drainage impact analyses;95 developing internal parking standards without 
planning commission or city council approval;96 and waiving development 
standards.97  In Friends of Westwood v. City of Los Angeles, the court found the 
issuance of a building permit for a 26-story office tower discretionary when 
the local agency relaxed some building and zoning standards and waived 
others for its construction.98  The court in that case emphasized that by 
modifying and waiving some of the zoning and building standards for the 
project, the local agency had the opportunity to mitigate the project’s 
potential environmental impacts on traffic controls, parking, and vehicle 
ingress and egress, but chose not to do so.99  Finally, in one instance, courts 
have the found issuance of a building permit to be a mixed-ministerial 
discretionary action when the project at issue is a component of a larger 
project subject to CEQA.100  The issuance of a building permit for a project is 
a component of a larger project where other discretionary approvals are 
required, like a variance, conditional use permit, or subdivision.101 
A grading permit is a compound ministerial-discretionary decision 
where the local agency could impose numerous conditions to the permit 
with the goal of reducing hazards to private and public property and 
90. Friends of Westwood, supra note 74 at 271 (quoting Ramey, supra note
86 at 193). 
91. Ramey, supra note 86 at 193.
92. Miller, supra note 74 at 1139.
93. Friends of Westwood, supra note 74 at 267.
94. Ronald E. Bass and Albert I. Herson., Preliminary Review, Exemptions,
and Negative Declarations, CALIFORNIA ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND LAND USE
PRACTICE (2008); Friends of Westwood, supra note 74 at 267. 
95. Bass & Herson, supra note 94; Day, supra note 72.
96. Bass & Herson, supra note 94; Friends of Westwood, supra note 74.
97. Id.
98. Id.
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protecting the safety of pedestrians and motorists.102  In one case, Day v. City 
of Glendale, the court remarked that the decision to condition a grading 
permit is an “exercise of judgment [and] deliberation” and was therefore
discretionary.103  That case involved the excavation and fill of earth within a 
70-acre canyon.104  That the conditions105 imposed on the grading permit
were not based on “fixed standards or objective measurements” convinced
the court that the issuance of the grading permit was of a mixed ministerial-
discretionary character.106 
A demolition permit is a mixed ministerial-discretionary action when 
local agency officials must be consulted prior to permit issuance.107  This is 
so because it is assumed that a local agency would prefer to preserve the 
structure as an alternative to demolishing it.108  San Diego Trust and Savings 
102. See Day, supra note 72.
103. Id. at 823.
104. Id. at 819.
105. The City of Glendale Municipal Code imposes the following duties
on the city engineer.  The City Engineer, in turn, imposes conditions in 
accordance to the Code: 
-- after visual inspection of the grading site the city engineer may 
require submission of geological and soil reports with 
recommendations regarding the effect of geological and soil 
conditions on the proposed development, and those 
recommendations approved by the city engineer must be 
incorporated in the grading plan (§§ 23-15(b) and (c));
-- the city engineer may impose regulations with respect to access 
routes to hillside grading projects “as he shall determine are
required in the interest of safety precautions involving pedestrian 
or vehicular traffic” (§ 23-16(f));
-- in granting the permit the city engineer must attach such 
conditions as may be necessary to prevent creation of hazard to 
public or private property (§ 23-16(g)(5)); 
-- if the city engineer determines that the land area for which 
grading is proposed is subject to geological or flood hazard to the 
extent that no reasonable amount of corrective work can 
eliminate or sufficiently reduce the hazard to persons or property, 
he must deny the grading permit (§ 23-18).
Day, supra note 72 at 823. 
106. Id.
107. See San Diego Trust & Sav., supra note 78.
108. Id.
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Bank v. City of San Diego illustrates this rule.109  In San Diego Trust, the court 
ruled that the issuance of permit to demolish a historic structure was a 
mixed ministerial-discretionary project because under the city’s historic 
preservation ordinance the “[Historic Resources] Board [had to] investigate
and confer with the responsible parties and under these powers impliedly 
will attempt to secure themselves alternatives where appropriate.”110  Since
the Historic Resources Board had several options in how it acted on the 
project, exercising their options resulted in a discretionary decision.111 
There are no cases, however, considering whether administrative land 
use entitlements, such as administrative conditional use permits or 
administrative design review, are mixed ministerial-discretionary actions 
under CEQA.  Rather than requiring traditional requirements of notice and 
public hearing, planning commission and/or committee review, and 
extended length of review, these projects only require review at the staff 
level and within a shortened period of time.112  Many jurisdictions have the 
administrative design review and/or administrative conditional use permit 
options to streamline the review process for projects that are presumed less 
intrusive and controversial.113  Given that the CEQA Guidelines deem 
conditional use permits as discretionary,114 it would seem logical that an 
administrative conditional use permit would be a mixed ministerial-
discretionary project under CEQA.  But characterizing an administrative 
design review decision is more problematic.  The Guidelines make no 
mention of design review as a discretionary action.115  Although some courts 
have deemed design review discretionary under CEQA, see supra, other 
courts have been reluctant to acknowledge that design review is within the 
reach of CEQA because it addresses purely aesthetic issues.116  Following the 
rationale of the former group of courts and those in the building permit 
cases, administrative design review would be of a mixed ministerial-
discretionary character since the decision contains discretionary elements, 
like recommendations for design modifications and evaluations of the 
project’s aesthetic compatibility with the surrounding natural and built 
environment.  If the rationale of the latter courts is followed, the local 
109. Id.
110. Id. at 211.
111. See id.
112. Jack L. Nasar & Peg Grannis, Design Review Reviewed: Administrative
versus Discretionary Methods, 65 J. OF THE AM. PLAN. ASS’N (1999). 
113. Id.
114. CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 14, § 15147 (2009).
115. Id.
116. See Bowman v. City of Berkeley, 122 Cal. App. 4th 572 (2005)’CAL.
CODE REGS. tit. § 21001(b) (2009).
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agency’s designation of the action controls, and courts must defer to the 
local ordinance’s characterization of administrative design review actions. 
According to this reasoning, if the local ordinance defines administrative 
design review actions as ministerial, then they fall outside the ambit of 
CEQA; if the local ordinance characterizes administrative design review 
actions as discretionary, then CEQA applies.  This rationale does not 
address the problem when a local ordinance does not designate an 
administrative design review action as either ministerial or discretionary. 
And this is likely in jurisdictions where land use tools are adopted to 
address pressing land use issues. 
III. The Appropriate Standard of Review for Mixed Ministerial –
Discretionary Land Use Decisions
A. Overview of Judicial Review in the Land Use Context
When a local agency’s land use decision is challenged, the petitioner 
usually files a writ of mandate action with the court.  The writ of mandate is 
a court action to review a decision by the local agency.117  The mandate 
proceeding functions as an appeal of the local agency’s decision to the court 
because it is reviewing the agency’s decision in light of evidence presented 
to the agency.118  Once the petitioner has filed an appeal, the respondent 
local agency must prepare an administrative record for the court, consisting 
usually of staff reports, meeting minutes, and resolutions, and after hearing 
oral argument from both sides, the court enters a decision.119 
There are two different types writ of mandate applicable in the land 
use context: traditional mandamus and administrative mandamus.120  The 
type of mandate available depends on the classification of the land use 
decision.  For legislative and ministerial decisions, traditional mandamus is 
the appropriate writ; for discretionary actions, an administrative mandate is 
appropriate.  Ultimately, the classification of the land use decision gives rise 
to an important difference in the nature and scope of review of the local 
agency decisions by the courts.  Thus, the nature of the agency’s action 
dictates the scope of judicial review.121  When reviewing ministerial 
decisions, courts will look to whether the agency’s decision was arbitrary, 
117. DANIEL J. CURTIN ET. AL., CURTIN’S CALIFORNIA LAND USE AND




121. CURTIN, supra note 117.
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capricious, or lacking in evidentiary support.122  The writ in ministerial 
decisions can only be used to compel the agency to act, but not challenge 
the substance of its decision.123  For discretionary decisions, the court 
evaluates whether the local agency has made findings to support its 
decision and whether those findings are supported by substantial evidence, 
also known as the substantial evidence test.124 
B. Suggested Standard of Review for Mixed Ministerial-Discretionary
Action
As discussed in previous sections, under common law, the court on a 
case-by-case basis evaluates the characterization of agency’s action.125  
Generally, when an agency is required by law to make a decision and the 
decision involves “only the use of fixed standards or objective measures, and
the pubic official cannot use personal subjective judgment in deciding 
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Judicial review of quasi-legislative planning and zoning decisions,
such as the adoption or amendment of general plans and the enactment of 
zoning ordinances, is normally obtained by a petition for a writ of ordinary 
mandamus under Code Civ. Proc. § 1085. In such a proceeding, the scope of
review is limited to a determination of whether the agency’s action was 
arbitrary, capricious, or entirely lacking in evidentiary support, or whether the 
agency failed to follow the procedure and give the notices required by law. 
 Judicial review of an agency’s quasi-judicial planning and zoning 
decisions, such as approvals of conditional use permits and tentative tract 
maps, is normally obtained by a petition for a writ of administrative 
mandamus under Code Civ. Proc. § 1094.5.  In general, the appropriate
standard of review of an agency’s quasi-judicial actions under local planning 
and zoning laws is the ‘‘substantial evidence’’ test. A reviewing court must 
determine whether substantial evidence supports the agency’s findings and 
whether the findings support the agency’s decision. In making these 
determinations, the court must resolve reasonable doubts in favor of the 
agency’s administrative findings and decision. Nevertheless, despite the 
applicability of the substantial evidence rule and the deference due to the 
administrative findings and decision, judicial review of planning and zoning 
decisions must not be perfunctory or mechanically superficial. Vigorous and 
meaningful judicial review facilitates the intended division of decision-
making labor in land-use control. 
Carlyle W. Hall Jr., Writs of Administrative or Traditional Mandamus or “Ordinary”
Mandamus, CALIFORNIA ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND LAND USE PRACTICE (2008). 
125. See § II.A. of this Note.
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whether or how the project should be carried out,”126 it is a ministerial
action.  In a discretionary action, on the other hand, a local agency applies 
its judgment to determine whether the project complies with general 
standards.127  No rule or line of cases has developed under common law that 
could provide guidance on the appropriate standard of review for decisions 
which have both ministerial and discretionary elements.  A line of cases has 
developed, however, in the mixed discretionary-legislative context that 
addresses the appropriate standard of review for those decisions. 
The courts are split in the mixed discretionary-legislative context on 
which standard of review should apply to those decisions.128  Some courts 
look to the nature and function of the agency’s action.129  One court ruled 
that when a local agency determines a project’s conformance or 
nonconformance with a local coastal plan, but did not have the authority to 
promulgate any specific development rules, it constituted a predominately 
discretionary act.130  Thus, the substantial evidence test under the adminis-
trative mandate applied.  Other courts in this context, however, have applied 
the more stringent standard of review when a decision simultaneously 
involves both discretionary and legislative acts, such as reviewing a general 
plan amendment and design review application concurrently.131  A third 
group of courts have used a “bifurcated standard of review”, which parse out
legislative aspects from discretionary aspects and analyze the component 
under their respective standards of review.132 
Given this disunity among the courts in the discretionary-legislative 
context, and given that mixed ministerial-discretionary decisions are 
contemplated in CEQA, the appropriate standard of review should be 
dictated by CEQA, and not by the common law.  Under CEQA, judicial review 
of a discretionary decision must follow the administrative mandamus 
procedure.133  Just like decisions deemed discretionary under the common 
126. Mountain Lion Found. v. Fish & Game Comm’n, 16 Cal. 4th 105, 117 (1997). 
127. See supra note 124.
128. Carlyle W. Hall Jr., Standard of Review, CALIFORNIA ENVIRONMENTAL
LAW AND LAND USE PRACTICE (2008). 
129. Id.
130. See City of Chula Vista v. Superior Court, 133 Cal. App. 3d 472 (1982).
131. See Hall, supra note 128.
132. Id.
133. CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 21168 provides that review of an agency’s
adjudicatory or quasi-judicial CEQA decision, made as a result of a 
proceeding in which by law a hearing is required to be given, evidence is 
required to be taken, and discretion in the determination of facts is vested in 
a public agency, must follow the administrative mandamus procedure of 
CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1094.5.  CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 21168.5 provides for
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law, the court may not substitute its own judgment for the local agency’s, 
but may only determine whether the act or decision is supported by 
substantial evidence based on the administrative record.134  When in doubt, 
projects of a mixed ministerial-discretionary character are resolved under 
CEQA as discretionary, so the administrative mandamus and the 
accompanying substantial evidence test would apply.135  Even though there 
are courts that defer to the local ordinance to determine whether an action 
is discretionary or ministerial,136 many jurisdictions have appropriated their 
definitions of ministerial and discretionary from the Guidelines.137  
Moreover, when a local agency codifies entitlements in the zoning 
ordinance, a threshold issue is whether such action is discretionary or 
ministerial.  This can be attributed to the mandate of CEQA to provide the 
broadest protection to the environment.  Furthermore, when a planner 
chooses to place conditions on a building permit application or when a 
planner determines whether a administrative design review or conditional 
use permit complies with the enumerated standards, such determinations 
go beyond being merely routine.  The decision to impose a particular 
condition or standard on a project varies from project to project, and 
requires an assessment of the circumstances specific to each case rather 
than applying the same specifications and rules to every project.  This, in 
turn, requires the judgment of the individual to effectuate the overarching 
goals of the policy power of the agency. 
review of quasi-legislative agency actions by petition for traditional 
mandamus. Under § 21168.5, the inquiry extends only to whether there was
a prejudicial abuse of discretion. Abuse of discretion is established if the 
agency has not proceeded in a manner required by law or if the 
determination or decision is not supported by substantial evidence. The 
California Supreme Court has held that courts generally may consider only 
the administrative record in determining whether there has been a 
prejudicial abuse of discretion within the meaning of CAL. PUB. RES. CODE §
21168.5 (West 2009). 
134. Id.
135. § 21080.
136. Bowman, supra note 116.
137. A cursory review of over 149 jurisdictions’ zoning ordinances has
found that approximately 38 of them have adopted some or all of the 
Guidelines definitions of ministerial and discretionary in their “Definitions”
sections. 
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IV. Conclusion
Land use regulation has developed as an instrumental means of 
ensuring the health, safety, and welfare of the public.  As it has rapidly 
evolved over the last century, so too have mechanisms to implement land 
use regulation policy.  Simultaneously, the number of cases challenging 
land use decisions have increased exponentially and the courts have not 
kept up with the novel ways in which local agencies have addressed land use 
concerns.  As the public demands more transparency and consistency from 
local agencies, especially in the land use realm, local agencies are pressed 
to find more immediate solutions to imminent land use problems.  The 
response of local agencies to land use problems has been creation of a fairly 
novel category of decisions: mixed ministerial-discretionary decisions. 
Although CEQA makes explicit mention of such agency actions in the 
statute, there have been a limited number of cases which have addressed 
this issue.  Based on the failure of the courts within the context of mixed 
discretionary-legislative cases to establish a uniform set of rules 
determining the standard of review for courts to follow, and given that CEQA 
is invoked in so many planning decisions, the taxonomy of land use 
decisions should apply to all land use decisions, regardless of whether 
CEQA applies to the project.  This would result in a more predictable and 
transparent process not only for the courts, but for also for local agencies. 
In addition, a uniform definition of mixed ministerial-discretionary project 
and standard of review would not come at the danger of usurping local 
government authority because many jurisdictions have appropriated the 
CEQA classifications in their own ordinances.  Finally, and most 
importantly, it would mend relations between the local agencies and their 
citizens and help restore the perception of the local agency’s legitimacy 
among its constituents. 
